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Abstract
“Women must work fifteen months and eight days to earn what men earn in a year" (Lesley, 1999). In a
society where women are often single mothers who must support both themselves and children, why would
they get paid less than men for doing the same job? When John F. Kennedy passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
which promised women "equal pay for equal work," women earned only 58 cents for every dollar men earned.
This pay gap is disappearing at a rate of about ten cents every twenty to thirty years (Leinwand, 1999). And
more recently, President Clinton announced last year that the government would enforce equal-pay laws more
diligently in 1999 and in the future. Employers were told to look more closely at their compensation policies
and other possible sources of (unintentional) gender bias (Fitzer, 1999).
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol9/iss1/15
The Park Place Economist / vol. IX 53
The Family Gap: Do Mothers Earn
Less?
By Alicia Lange
I.  INTRODUCTION
“Women must work fifteen months and eightdays to earn what men earn in a year"(Lesley, 1999).  In a society where women
are often single mothers who must support both them-
selves and children, why would they get paid less than
men for doing the same job?  When John F. Kennedy
passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which promised
women "equal pay for equal work," women earned
only 58 cents for every dollar men earned. This pay
gap is disappearing at a rate of about ten cents every
twenty to thirty years (Leinwand, 1999).  And more
recently, President Clinton announced last year that
the government would enforce equal-pay laws more
diligently in 1999 and in the future.  Employers were
told to look more closely at their compensation poli-
cies and other possible sources of (unintentional) gen-
der bias  (Fitzer, 1999).  Michael Bartlett, U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce manager of labor law policy, states
that, "any pay inequity is the result of muddled arith-
metic, faulty logic and failing to control for variables
such as experience, education and choice of occupa-
tion.  Women being absent from the work force for
some period of time I think does adversely impact on
their wages, as it should, because they don't have as
much experience."  When these variables are consid-
ered, the Independent Women's Forum found the pay
gap is almost non-existent for childless women be-
tween ages of 27 and 33.  However, in 1999, women
supposedly still earned only 76 cents for every dollar
earned by a man  (Leinwald, 1999).
The gender pay gap, no matter what the sta-
tistical discrepancy, is narrowing.  But while the gen-
der pay gap's 'glass ceiling' has received so much at-
tention, another pay gap has been increasing and has
received very little attention.  This pay gap is the 'family
gap’; the pay penalty that women with children get in
relation to women without children.  And it is this
obscure pay gap, dealing with the division of domes-
tic labor, that is suspected to contribute to the gender
pay gap (Joshi, Paci, & Waldfogel, 1999).  Jane
Waldfogel found that between 1980 and 1991, the
pay ratio between mothers and non-mothers has in-
creased by 7.5%.  She states that "in 1980, young
mothers earned 56% of the average male salary, while
non-mothers earned 66%, so the gap between moth-
ers and non-mothers relative to men's pay was 10%.
By 1991, young mothers had improved their hourly
earnings to 72.6% of the average male level, but the
ratio for non-mothers had risen all the way to 90.1%
of average male earnings"  (Waldfogel, 1998).
This paper will focus on this family pay gap
because it is not as well publicized to the average
female worker, although it affects millions of women
everyday.  There is abundant research available with
theories on why this pay gap may or may not exist;
although plentiful, the research is often contradictory.
Section II will present the differing views on the fam-
ily pay gap as presented in previous research.  A sta-
tistical analysis using data from the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) database will also be
presented with variables extracted from those theo-
ries.  Policy implications will then be made based on
the results of the regressions.  And, especially if you
are a woman planning on having children someday
while working at a successful career, read on.  The
following pages will be of great interest.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Four hypotheses will be looked at as poten-
tial sources of the family pay gap, with three coming
from one prominent researcher in this area.  Jane
Waldfogel has done abundant research on the family
pay gap, conducting several studies specifically aimed
at the penalty for women with children, across sev-
eral years.  Waldfogel offers three of these hypoth-
eses to account for the unexplainable portion of the
family pay gap she discovered in her study (1998),
which was a 10%-15% pay penalty for women with
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children compared to women without - even after
controlling for human capital differences:
1) Inadequate labor market institutional factors,
such as maternity leave and child care poli-
cies
2) Women with children may have differing atti-
tudes towards work than women without chil-
dren. (i.e. they are less motivated to perform
well or give less effort to their job and more
to home)
3) Women with children are discriminated against
by employers (Waldfogel, 1998)
4) Becker's Human Capital Model
In accordance with her first hypothesis,
Waldfogel studied the maternity leave policies in sev-
eral countries in relation to the family pay gaps, and
found that countries with more adequate maternity
leave policies (more weeks of absence allowed) had
a smaller pay gap between mothers and non-moth-
ers.  To accomplish this, employers in these countries
must either pay women more for the few hours they
do work, or have paid maternity leave.  The United
States, on the other hand, was actually without a ma-
ternity leave policy until the passing of the Family and
Medical Leave Act in 1993, only seven years ago!
And still, the United States ties with Switzerland and
offers the shortest leave period of twelve weeks (com-
bined maternity and parental leave).  These allowed
absences in the U.S. are unpaid, unlike the majority
of other countries.  The countries with the longest ma-
ternity leaves were Denmark (18 weeks for mater-
nity leave, 10-52 weeks for parental leave) and Fin-
land (17.5 weeks for maternity leave, 26-156 weeks
for parental leave).  Germany's parental leave was as
high as 156 weeks (Waldfogel, 1998)!
In addition, the United States also relies on
private market distribution of child care, which raises
the costs to women who have children.  The cost of
care as a percentage of female earnings for the U.S.
is 22%, whereas it is 0% for Belgium and France,
who also offer 15 and 16 weeks of maternity leaves,
respectively.  There is no notable pay gap between
mothers and non-mothers in Belgium, Australia, Swe-
den, Finland and Canada, which is most likely reflec-
tive of the maternity leave and child care policies of
those countries (Waldfogel, 1998).  This may be re-
flective of the laws enforced in these specific coun-
tries regarding maternity leave.  Another study com-
pares the gender pay gap between Sweden, which
has one of the highest gender pay ratios, and the United
States, which has one of the lowest.  The researchers
found that the U.S. had a gender pay gap (men-
women pay difference) 9% higher than that of Swe-
den.  Part of this difference was attributed to Sweden's
more generous family/maternity leave policy, which
may cause more women to stick with one firm through
her child-rearing and therefore not lose human capital
or necessitate more firm-specific training when she
re-enters the work force (Blau & Kahn, 1999).
Groshen also theorizes that women most likely have
a greater desire for a job with better fringe benefits,
such as better maternity leave policies or flexible hours,
and it is these jobs that have a lower wage in return
for the greater benefits (Groshen, 1991).
Waldfogel's second hypothesis deals with
women's attitudes and social factors.  It is a well-
established fact that women with children are less
likely to have successful careers.  One possible rea-
son for this is that successful families must tradition-
ally contain two specialized roles: one adult must earn
money in the job-market, and one adult must main-
tain order and raise children in the 'home-market.'
The woman usually ends up in this 'home-market',
and therefore must leave her job if the family is to be
as successful as possible; it is difficult to raise children
if  parents must split their time between a job and
home.  According to Blau and Ferber (1990),  women
select jobs that offer less penalties for taking time off,
and therefore lose job experience.  "Because women
intend to spend substantial amounts of time out of the
labor market, they are willing to accept lower rewards
for experience in return for lower depreciation rates
during periods of work interruption"  (p.583).  As
cited by Waldfogel, another pay gap researcher,
Goldin (1997), used several different definitions of
‘career’ and consistently found that college-educated
women who had children were less likely to have a
career than those who were childless (Waldfogel,
1998).  This supports the theory that a woman's so-
cial factors and motivation levels can have negative
effects on her career and income attainment, but it
could also be attributed to the Human Capital Theory
of job experience and productivity, which is the fourth
hypothesis considered in this paper.
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Becker (1985), who introduced the Human
Capital Model for wage inequality, is cited by
Korenman and Neumark (1992) as having hypoth-
esized that "a portion of male-female wage differen-
tials is attributable to gender-role specialization by
married women and men.  In particular, he has ar-
gued that the 'hourly earnings of single women [should]
exceed those of married women even when both work
the same number of hours and have the same market
capital because child care and other household re-
sponsibilities induce married women to seek more
convenient and less energy intensive jobs'" (p.235).
This prediction that labor market experience explains
much of the family pay gap has been supported by
several studies, which found a narrowed family gap
when tenure and experience are taken into account.
As cited by Waldfogel (1997), Hill (1979) found no
unexplained pay gap at all when controlling for work
experience.  But other studies, including Waldfogel's,
found that an unexplained pay gap still remains, re-
gardless of whether experience and number of hours
are included even when controlling for part-time work
status (Waldfogel, 1997).  Along with the Human
Capital Theory, Korenman & Neumark discuss four
potential problems that may be encountered when
studying the effects of marriage and motherhood on
wages: endogeneity of marriage and motherhood,
experience and tenure endogeneity, selectivity into
employment, and heterogeneity.  Even after including
the variables tenure and experience, which were as-
sumed to have biased previous research on this topic,
the negative relationship between children and wages
did not disappear.  After running a regression, they
came to the conclusion that "the size and statistical
significance of the wage effects of children are sensi-
tive to the exclusion of experience and tenure con-
trols, and to their estimated coefficients".    A regres-
sion in which these variables were included did not
support the notion that children reduce wages.  This
may lead to the conclusion that motherhood indirectly
penalizes wages, and this penalty only happens through
loss of human capital and tenure (Korenman &
Neumark, 1992).
Barry Gerhart (1990) studied the salaries of
both men and women employed by a firm between
1976 and 1986, and looked at human capital vari-
ables.  In his study, current salary was a function of
year of hire, potential experience, degree, firm ten-
ure, college major, performance, and job title; these
factors were studied for both college graduates and
non-college graduates.  There were three sets of ex-
ogenous variables: human capital (experience, edu-
cation), college major, and tenure.  In his results,
Gerhart found that women's salaries are 97%-98%
of men's in college graduates, and 94%-95% for the
sample combining college and non-college workers.
In terms of individual variables, men were found to
have greater returns for higher degree levels.  Ac-
cording to Gerhart, "College major was found to be a
key determinant of differences between men and
women in starting salaries, consistent with results ob-
tained by Daymont and Andrisiani (1984).  In the
college graduate sample, differences in college major
held by men and women accounted for 43% of start-
ing salary differences" (Gerhart, 1990). Men's higher
starting salaries were found to be significantly influ-
enced by higher degree attainments and different col-
lege majors.  Theoretically speaking, this unequal col-
lege major distribution, as well as unequal job distri-
butions, was found to be important in determining if a
gender pay gap does indeed exist.  This also contrib-
utes to the concept of different human capital levels
earning more or less pay, which can be traced across
to the family pay gap as well.
Related to Human Capital theory, one study
conducted in Britain looked at part-time working
mothers and how their decreased time in the work
force has a negative effect on their pay.  Although this
study is done with British women, many of the con-
cepts may be applied to American women as well.  In
the late 1980s through today, many British employers
are developing 'family-friendly' policies of more flex-
ible hours, workplace nurseries, and more structured
maternity leave time.  However, after analyzing data
collected from two longitudinal women's databases,
there was "little evidence that having children in itself
results in consistently adverse rates of pay, once one
allows for human capital and sector of employment.
However, taken together, our results suggest that the
structure of the British labor market does present
obstacles to high earnings by women with children .. .
relative pay in part-time employment have deterio-
rated" (Joshi, Paci, & Waldfogel, 1999).  It makes
sense to then conclude that, unless new mothers con-
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tinue working full-time, their human capital depreci-
ates and their pay decreases.  This is why adequate
and effective maternity leave policies are so impor-
tant.
The last theory is simply discrimination.  Mar-
ried men with children earn more than unmarried men
without - the exact opposite of women.  According
to Waldfogel, not only do married women with chil-
dren earn much less than all men and childless women,
but they earn more than unmarried/divorced women
with children.  Married women with children had pay
increases of 13.7% from previous pay between 1978
and 1994; they earned 76.5% of men in 1994.  Di-
vorced mothers had pay increases of 4% between
the same years; they earned 66% of men's pay in
1994.  To worsen this even more, never married
mothers had pay decreases from 1978 to 1994; they
earn only 56.5% of what men earn (Waldfogel, 1998).
This is a startling statistic, considering the fact that
single mothers are the ones that are in the most need
of money to support themselves and their children.
However, some single women who have children are
also less likely to have adequate education to earn
them higher-paying jobs.  But it is also possible that
these pay differences are a result of discrimination on
the part of employers.
III.  HYPOTHESES & EMPIRICAL MODEL
Each variable included in the research design
is intended to test one of the theories presented pre-
viously.  The dependent variable is income (Income),
measured as individual income from all wages and
salaries within one year.  The variables to be included
for each theory are listed here and described in detail
with their predicted signs and reason for inclusion in
Table 1.
The empirical model for this cross-sectional
study is: Income = A + B1(Gender) + B2(Mar) +
B3(FamSize) + B4(SpseIncm) + B5(Tenure) +
B6(Age) + B7(ChldCare) + B8(FrngBen) +
B9(Hours).  Two interaction variables will also be
included in separate regressions: (FamSize x Gen-
der) and (Gender x Mar x FamSize).  This is to de-
termine whether the presence of children or being
married has a different effect for women than for men.
Inadequate labor market institutional factors
will be tested using fringe benefits (FrngBenefits), or
whether maternity/paternity leave allows the employee
to return to her/his old job or one that pays equally
after having children.  Child care (ChldCare) repre-
sents whether the employer provided or subsidized
child care.  The main potential problem with these
variables is that they may actually reduce income; an
employer may offer a $50,000 salary with few ben-
efits or a $40,000 with abundant benefits (therefore
the benefits come at the sacrifice of the salary).  But
here, the hypothesis remains that benefits such as
maternity leave or child care prompt a woman to work
more hours, because she can do so without worrying
about the care of her child.
Low motivation theory is going to be very
hard to test, but the variable hours worked (Hours)
might serve as both a control variable and also to
indicate that women who are less motivated to work
(who allow themselves to fall behind in their job) will
take more hours or sick days off.  The spouse’s in-
come (SpseIncome) variable is included because, al-
though this is a broad assumption, I am assuming that
a mother whose spouse makes a high income will be
more likely to prioritize children at the sacrifice of her
job or hours worked.  With this theory, an alternative
explanation for low motivation is that women have
less job opportunities, and therefore have less moti-
vation, but this doesn't directly tie into how the pres-
ence of children affects women's pay.  Though hard
to measure and not included in this study, fewer job
opportunities is a feasible explanation for the gender
pay gap.
Discrimination theory variables will include the
marriage (Mar) variable to test if married women are
penalized with lower pay.  A family size (FamSize)
variable is included to test for the main problem,
whether pay decreases with the presence of children.
As the family size increases, the time needed for chil-
dren may increase; the type of job a mother of five
accepts may differ from the type of job a mother of
one accepts, therefore decreasing pay.  However, it
should be noted that there may be some cross-over
effects with this theory and Becker's Human Capital
theory for these two variables.  Gender (Gender) will
serve to compare women to men as well, because it
would be interesting to see if children or marriage have
the same effects for men as for women.
Becker's Human Capital theory will involve
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Table 1: Variables Included in Empirical Model
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
ELBAIRAV N MUMINIM MUMIXAM NAEM .DTS NOITAIVED
emocnI 429,7 0 851,361 66.815,52 21.725,62
mcnIespS 437,4 0 819,791 86.936,82 24.097,23
eziSmaF 993,8 1 51 43.3 36.1
egA 993,8 33 14 18.63 52.2
sruoH 403,8 0 637,8 37.087,1 61.470,1
eruneT 724,7 1 774,1 30.772 76.172
NdilaV 641,4
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elbairaV 1#noissergeR 2#noissergeR 3#noissergeR 4#noissergeR
tnatsnoC )000.(5.441,73- )000.(1.019,8 )000.(3.403,92- )000.(5.068,82-
redneG )000.(2.661,61 )000.(4.786,61 )271.(4.506,4 )000.(5.789,6
eruneT )000.(1.11 )000.(9.01 )000.(1.11
sruoH )000.(5.9 )000.(78.9 )000.(6.9
raM )000.(0.494,7 )000.(2.128,9 )000.(2.602,7
eziSmaF )696.(8.161 )490.(0.464- )710.(6.154,1-
mcnIespS )000.(811. )000.(221. )000.(821.
eraCdlhC )300.(0.541,5 )000.(9.048,5 )300.(2.299,4 )400.(8.748,4
neBgnrF )000.(9.327,4 )000.(7.656,9 )000.(6.856,4 )000.(9.307,4
egA )200.(5.326 )300.(6.506 )300.(9.695
xeziSmaF(
)redneG )000.(1.138,2
xraMxredneG(
)eziSmaF )000.(9.773,2
R2 eulav )000.(572. )000.(871. )000.(872. )000.(972.
Table 3: Regression Results: Coefficient Value (Significance Level)
the variable tenure (Tenure), which will also serve as
a control for level of job status, which would affect
level of pay.  Age (Age) will also serve as a control,
assuming that pay increases with age and experience.
A variable for education could be included, but be-
cause different areas of study yield very different lev-
els of pay despite hours worked and job tenure, this
was left out.
The data for this study comes from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data series.
Each variable, with the exception of gender, was cho-
sen from the most recent year, 1998.  The descriptive
statistics explaining the collected data are found in
Table 2.
IV.  RESULTS
 The results for the regressions are in Table 3.
Regression #1 is the original and first regression run,
in which every variable is included.  Unfortunately,
the family size variable was not significant.  It should
be noted, that with an alternate variable for marriage
(that was not included in the final regressions in this
study), with 1=never married, 2=married, spouse
present, 3=other, family size was significant when a
regression was run.  This is in opposition to the Mar-
riage variable that was actually used here (a simple
dummy variable with not married=0, married=1),
which, when combined with family size, the latter was
not significant.  The reason for this is not clear, but
because of the interaction variables and complex num-
ber of other factors being examined here, a simplified
marriage variable was most appropriate to use.  There-
fore, the insignificance of family size, which is in es-
sence testing one of the main factors of this paper, is
simply due to an interaction with the marriage vari-
able that was used.  This will be shown in a later re-
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gression, in which combining family size and marriage
into one variable yields favorable results.
Regression #2 focuses on the family gap alone;
the labor market theory variables are included here
and the control variables are not.  This was done to
see if child care benefits and marriage affect income
in the absence of control variables.  The value of fringe
benefits increased here by almost 100% as compared
to the original regression, which can be interpreted as
follows: the higher the benefits (such as flexible hours
or maternity leave) and child care availability, the easier
it is for an individual to work more hours or maintain
a high income.  Another interesting finding in this re-
gression is that, without control variables such as hours
worked, family size was actually negative and more
significant than previously (although not at the .05
level); implying that the larger the family, the less in-
come one earns.  Unfortunately, the R-square value
also drops to a poor .178.
Regression #3 includes the interaction vari-
able gender x family to determine if the effect of chil-
dren is different for women than for men.  In this con-
text, family size  is very significant.  According to these
results, there is a difference in favor of men, which is
seen because of the positive sign on the coefficient.
This means that men are rewarded with higher pay if
children are present, possibly even as number of chil-
dren increase, but this cannot be determined here for
certain.  Regression #4 includes a triple interaction
variable of gender x family size x married.  It's posi-
tive value indicates it is favorable to be a married male
with children, although the number of children cannot
be determined.
The R-square value was pretty low for all four
regressions, ranging from .178 to .279.  This may be
because there are so many factors influencing income,
including some not taken into account here, such as
region of residence, education level, industry of work
for a few examples.  But the high significance of the
regressions as a whole (.000) indicate that these vari-
ables do succeed in influencing income in the way in
which they were believed.
For the most part, the variables all had their
expected signs and were significant.  FamSize and
SpseIncm are two exceptions, which will be discussed
further in the next section.
V. DISCUSSION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Upon studying the results, there seems to be
a pay penalty for women with children and for women
who are married with children, as shown mostly by
the interaction variables included in the regressions of
this study.  Each theory is supported, using these re-
sults.  The discrimination theory is tentatively sup-
ported, particularly in the case of the triple interaction
variable of gender x family size x marriage.  How-
ever, Becker's Human Capital theory may also be
responsible for the results favoring men.  But, the gen-
der variable still favors men when control variables
are removed in regression #2, indicating marriage and
family size have negative effects on women not even
taking hours worked and tenure into account.  Labor
Market Theory is also supported because both fringe
benefits and child care had a positive effect on in-
come.  Human Capital Theory was supported as well,
but these were also expected results because the vari-
ables here were largely utilized as controls.  The Low
Motivation Theory was the only one that wasn't clearly
supported. This is because the variable for spouse's
income, which was predicted to be negative, was
positive (but by a very small amount).  Hours in this
category was also positive, but again, served as a
control, so this was expected.  One possible expla-
nation for the positive sign of spouse's income is that
people with similar income earnings potentials are
likely to marry each other, which may be related to
education levels and what couples are more likely to
succeed in a marriage.  This theory was the hardest
to measure in a regression and represent in a vari-
able, because it deals with an intangible like motiva-
tion.
This study did produce results similar to pre-
vious studies.  Jane Waldfogel's (1998) study found
that "having children had positive or no effects for
men, but very strongly negative effects for women"
(p.147).  The interaction variable coefficients in re-
gressions #3 and #4 of this study were 2,831.1 and
2,377.9, respectively; both favoring men with chil-
dren.  However, Waldfogel used two regressions in
her study, which is why she yielded negative results
for women.  If Female=1 had been used in this study,
a negative result would have been obtained.  Another
one of Waldfogel's studies had the same results of a
negative impact on women with children over both
The Family Gap: Do Mothers Earn Less?
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non-mothers and men with and without children
(Waldfogel, 1997).  Also similar to Waldfogel's study,
is the finding that maternity leave, or fringe benefits,
raises women's (and men's) income.  Waldfogel's rea-
soning is that benefits such as maternity leave raise
the probability that a woman will return to work at
the same job, or at least with the same employer, af-
ter giving birth.  Waldfogel points out that although
this effect is positive, it may also be offset by a strong
negative effect if the leave time taken from work is
very high.  Overall, this study's findings closely re-
sembled the findings in both of Waldfogel's, both of
which were discussed previously in the theory sec-
tion  (Waldfogel, 1998).
Korenman and Neumark (1992) conducted
a similar study, also discussed previously, in which
they found that the penalties to pay lessened (statisti-
cally) when control variables such as tenure were
added to the regression.  This means that the size of
the effects of children on pay reacts to these vari-
ables.  The findings in this study find the same thing;
the family size coefficient went from -464.0 without
tenure and hours, to 161.8 with these variables added.
The effect seemed smaller with the added control
variables, which supports the findings of their study.
One finding that contradicts one researcher's
ideas is that fringe benefits and child care are chosen
by women at the sacrifice of higher paying jobs.
Groshen (1991) states that, "if women have a greater
taste for fringe benefits or good working conditions,
and these vary by occupation or employer, women
will sort themselves into high-benefit/low-wage jobs"
(p.469).  According to these results, however, there
was a positive effect of benefits and child care to-
wards income.  As explained previously, this is prob-
ably due to an increased probability that women will
return to work or dedicate more hours towards her
job if child care is available.  Groshen's idea wasn't
supported clearly in his study either, but the results
from the regressions in this study offered more clear
evidence against this idea than his job-cell analysis
(Groshen, 1991).
Despite the results in this study complying
rather nicely with previous ones, there have been stud-
ies conducted which did not support a family pay gap
for women who choose to have children.  Joshi, Paci,
and Waldfogel (1999) found "little evidence that hav-
ing children in itself results in consistently adverse rates
of pay, once one allows for human capital and sector
of employment" (p.561).  There is obviously room
for further research in this area of study, and more
factors can be looked at.
Potential flaws with this study arise because
there are so many variables that affect each other,
which may bias results.  The number of hours worked
may be influenced by tenure, and number of children
may be affected by marriage, which may indeed be
the case here because there was an interaction be-
tween FamSize and Mar.  To continue this research,
it would be interesting to see if the family gap affects
younger mothers differently than older mothers.  Also,
future research could emphasize regional differences;
such as if urban areas are more tolerant of mothers
working, and not staying in the home with children,
than rural areas.
Several policy implications follow this kind of
study.  One is that sufficient maternity leave policies,
along with other fringe benefits, should be adminis-
tered to maintain their positive affect on income.  Along
with this same idea, more child care policies should
be administered by employers, looking at the graphs
in the appendix section, it is obvious that benefits such
as this are rare, yet are essential for a mother to main-
tain her job and income level to better support her
family.  This especially would apply to the case of the
single mother, who often has no other source of in-
come other than her job.  Apart from the just the fam-
ily pay gap, a policy such as this would also be ben-
eficial to the children of working mothers.  Although
this is costly for the employer, in the long run it is the
best way to maintain good job matches with employ-
ees and for maintaining a positive work environment;
it is likely that working mothers will be more efficient
if they know their children are being cared for prop-
erly.  Employers, mothers, and children would all ben-
efit from more family-friendly work environments and
salaries.
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